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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to examine the validity and utility of the category of artistic 
thinking through applying it to the description of an aesthetic situation as given by Ro-
man Ingarden. The authors are referring to the common understanding of the concept 
as well as Ingarden’s works, such as: Wykład XI and Przeżycie estetyczne. In this paper 
they discuss the components of an aesthetic situation, at the same time attempting to 
characterise the category of artistic thinking.
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Introduction
In this paper we attempt to juxtapose the category of artistic thinking 
with Roman Ingarden’s reflection on aesthetic situation. First of all, we 
aim to verify the usefulness and usability of the concept of artistic think-
ing to the analysis of art, and to propose directions in which Ingarden’s 
theory could be developed. At the same time, however, we would like to 
stress that this work remains solely an introductory research draft and 
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provides no exhaustive analysis of the posed problem. It is not our goal 
to derive the concept of artistic thinking from Ingarden’s theory, nor do 
we aim at correcting the theory in the light of the given category. It is only 
about juxtaposing these two separate proposals. Such an approach can be 
justified by the assumption that the concept of artistic thinking should be 
considered as a current modern category which, in our opinion, lacks In-
garden’s division into what is and what is not artistically and aesthetically 
valuable. At the same time, we presume that it would be possible to adapt 
the category of artistic thinking to Ingarden’s reflection. Such an attempt 
might involve coining a new term – this of aesthetic thinking – although 
that would exceed the scope of this basic and introductory work1.
So far, the concept of artistic thinking does not have any given and 
universally accepted definition. It seems to be rather intuitively under-
stood, and quite freely used. At the same time, it seems that the concept 
contributes to an interesting description of art, both from the point of 
view of the creative process and the reception and interpretation of art. 
In this way, the concept of artistic thinking is related to the activity of an 
artist creating his work, and the situation of the beholder observing the 
work and trying to understand it. We also assume that on the one hand 
artistic thinking points to the presence and importance of the intellec-
tual components and cognitive values of experiencing art, while on the 
other hand it tells us about certain features, which essentially differen-
tiate thinking about art (or thinking in art) from, say, scientific thinking. 
Characterising the experience of art in the light of the concept of an 
aesthetic situation, Ingarden describes all the sensations and actions of 
an individual as elements of a so called process of aesthetic experience. 
For him, aesthetic perception constitutes an additional element that may 
be built over the aesthetic experience in its final stage. This experience, 
requiring taking an aesthetic outlook on reality, is supposed to lead to cre-
ating an intentional aesthetic subject. And although the categories sug-
gested by Ingarden are also supposed to encompass the work of intellect 
(of the artist or the beholder)2, the stress here is on the emotional and 
1 On the subject of artistic and aesthetic values in R. Ingarden’s theory see: Z. Ma-
jewska, Wartość artystyczna – jakość artystyczna, in: Słownik pojęć filozoficznych Roma-
na Ingardena, red. A. J. Nowak, L. Sosnowski, Kraków 2001, pp. 290–292 and M. Goła-
szewska, Wartość estetyczna – jakość estetyczna, in: Słownik pojęć…, op. cit., pp. 292–295.
2 Ingarden describes the aesthetic experience as “a phase of very active, intense 
and creative individual life”. R. Ingarden, O poznawaniu dzieła literackiego, Warszawa 
1976, p. 137 [trans. M. Bręgiel-Benedyk].
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experiential aspect of experiencing art3. We feel, however, that such an ap-
proach is incomplete. The category of artistic thinking appears to soundly 
highlight the very important intellectual moments present in the experi-
ence of art and in the concept of aesthetic experience4.
The intention of our paper is to examine the validity and usefulness of 
the category of artistic thinking through applying it to the description of 
an aesthetic situation as given by Roman Ingarden. This attempt is also to 
underline the value of intellectual reflection in the creative process. The 
remaining part of the paper aims to characterise the category of artistic 
thinking as well as a critical analysis of Ingarden’s theory. 
Aesthetic situation and artistic thinking 
In this paper we are referring first and foremost to Wykład XI from 
Wykłady i dyskusje z estetyki5, in which Ingarden characterises his concept 
of aesthetic situation. Pondering upon the advantages of the term and its 
validity, Ingarden claims that it “allows to escape the differentiation be-
3 In the aesthetic experience Ingarden distinguishes the so called prefatory emotion 
related to the state of excitement with the quality present in the perceived object. The 
quality stimulates and excites the beholder, causing him a sense of wanting, almost being 
in love. After the prefatory emotion a new wave of emotions appear, “a certain form of 
liking, enjoying and caressing «with the sight», the presence of the quality, the moment 
of «delight»”. See: R. Ingarden, O poznawaniu dzieła literackiego, op. cit., pp. 138–139.
4 In his interesting work Idea koncepcyjnej teorii dzieł sztuki (Zarys), Michał Ostro-
wicki aims to define the essence of the work of art as a conceptual creation, for which 
the intentional activity of the subject and the meaning of the work become the consti-
tutive features. Ostrowicki emphasises that such understanding of art seems to be of 
a particular importance in the context of contemporary works, in which the aesthetic 
values often play a secondary role. He also claims that taking into consideration the 
conceptual nature of the work is closely connected with considering it an intentional 
phenomenon “expressing human emotions, feelings, values and knowledge. Through 
the peculiarity of its «existence», the work «creates» its own world in the beholder’s 
mind, liberates and shapes human thought, being allusive and reflective, often abstract 
in its function or real in its physical form”. See: M. Ostrowicki, Idea koncepcyjnej teorii 
dzieł sztuki (Zarys), “Kwartalnik Filozoficzny” 2000, t. XXVIII, z. 2 [trans. M. Bręgiel-Be-
nedyk], [online] http://www.ostrowicki.art.pl/Idea_koncepcyjnej_teorii_dziel_sztuki.
pdf [access: 7.08. 2014].
5 On an aesthetic situation see also: L. Sosnowski, Sytuacja estetyczna, in: Słownik 
pojęć…, op. cit., pp. 263–265.
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tween purely subjective and objective moments [in experiencing art]”6. 
This remark provides us with the basic definition of the term: Ingarden’s 
basic assumption is that the aesthetic situation consists both of subjective 
and objective components, which should be analysed inclusively, or rela-
tionally. Ingarden notes that subjectivity and objectivity are in fact the two 
sides of the same event – an encounter with art7. It follows that Ingarden’s 
concept of an aesthetic situation is actually a broader category than this of 
artistic thinking which describes the experience of art only from the point 
of view of an individual, as a subjective experience of the subject.
In the concept of an aesthetic situation, Ingarden introduces the dis-
tinction between the work of art and the creator being at the same time 
partly a beholder, or the beholder being partly the creator. It becomes im-
portant to perceive the situation in this way, as not to lock its particu-
lar components in strictly specified roles. Thus, the given distinction be-
tween the creator and the beholder should not be perceived as unambig-
uous and unquestionable, because these roles are rather intermingling. 
Ingarden clearly states that:
Every producer and every artist is at the same time to some extent a beholder of 
the produced or created work. And on the other hand […] the so called beholder, 
in the process of going into the completed work of art is at the same time a creator 
of the aesthetic object8.
It seems that the category of artistic thinking is very well suited for demon-
strating the proximity of the creative and receptive processes described 
by Ingarden. Understood in this way, artistic thinking might characterise 
both the creator and the beholder of the work of art, bonding them in the 
creative process of producing an aesthetic object.
According to Ingarden, an aesthetic situation indicating the encounter 
of the subject and the object is to be perceived in a dynamic way. There 
are two reasons for that: firstly, because its components intermingle, and 
secondly, because every encounter is always an active process. Whenever 
a given subject enters into a relationship with an object, each of the compo-
nents of this relationship influences the other and alters it. Thus the rela-
tionship is a reflexive one, with its altered components producing a higher- 
6 R. Ingarden, Wykład jedenasty, in: idem, Wybór pism estetycznych, Kraków 2005, 
p. 34 [trans. M. Bręgiel-Benedyk].
7 See: ibidem.
8 Ibidem.
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-order value – the rule applies also to an aesthetic situation. According to 
Ingarden, when an artist shapes his work of art, and when a beholder per-
ceives the completed work, the process of intermingling of all its compo-
nents occurs, resulting in the emergence of a work of art, an aesthetic ob-
ject, and a certain emotional reaction of the creator and the beholder to 
what has been created. These remarks allow us to conclude that for an ap-
propriate grasp of artistic thinking it is necessary to assume the existence 
of a strong and constant relation of this kind of intellectual insight with the 
sphere of emotions and feelings (no such interrelation can, as we know, oc-
cur in the case of scientific thinking). This particular feature appears to be 
a distinctive quality of the concept of artistic thinking, with the interrela-
tion being interpreted as, for instance, a transposition of emotions accom-
panying the creation into ideas, concepts, values and particular images.
According to Ingarden, a creator, who in an aesthetic situation is also 
a beholder, has to knowingly monitor the changes made to the work, to be 
cognizant of the direction of his actions, and to be aware of when the crea-
tive process is complete. At the same time, the created work is undergoing 
constant transformations. A beholder, being at the same time a creator, 
also participates in them, because the constitution of an aesthetic object 
needed in the process of reception requires his active stance and particu-
lar creative action9.
Ingarden distinguishes the subjective and objective components of an 
aesthetic situation, making it clear that they must not be treated separate-
ly. They have to be analysed within the context of a comprehensively un-
derstood aesthetic situation. He distinguishes four objective components 
of an aesthetic situation:
 – an object given to the artist or beholder – by which we understand 
a certain physical object or e.g. certain sounds influencing the subject 
and prompting a particular action;
 – a material foundation of the work of art – or a material basis of the 
work, being a physical object already created and visible, an object of 
everyday experience, e.g. a particular lump of marble;
 – a work of art – an object created or converted from something else, 
non physical and non psychic;
9 In her work Świadomość piękna, Maria Gołaszewska regards an aesthetic situation 
as the actual subject of aesthetics. She underlines that it is extremely important to consid-
er all its components cumulatively at all times. See: M. Gołaszewska, Świadomość piękna: 
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 – an aesthetic object – by which Ingarden means first of all the con-
cretization of the work of art obtained by the perceptor understood 
both as the creator and the beholder of the work.
The passages from one component of an aesthetic situation to the next 
occur both at the objective and subjective level, and they are described 
and analysed by Ingarden one by one. However, it has to be repeated and 
highlighted that they constitute two sides of the same complex process, 
and as such should be treated cumulatively10. A diagram based on In-
garden’s descriptions of an aesthetic situation (Wykład XI and Przeżycie 
estetyczne) looks as follows:
According to Ingarden, the process he calls an aesthetic situation be-
gins with an encounter between a human and a given object11. This is the 
starting point, where an impulse leading to the creation of a work of art 
first occurs. Ingarden points out to a moment when an element of the out-
side world catches the artist’s attention, causes him “to stop”, or, as he 
puts it, “makes him think”12. In our opinion this very moment can also be 
considered the origin of artistic thinking, which involves getting distract-
ed from everyday issues and turning full attention towards one particular 
component of the world. It should be stressed here that both the aesthetic 
situation and artistic thinking are of an intentional character13.
The object that the creator (and at the same time the beholder) is deal-
ing with in the beginning of an aesthetic situation, is called by Ingarden the 
initial object. And according to the diagram illustrating an aesthetic situa-
tion, from the objective side we are dealing with a passage from an existing 
physical object to a produced object as a material foundation of a work of 
10 See: R. Ingarden, Wykład…, op. cit., p. 36.
11 And it is not necessarily an existing physical object, which will undergo physical 
transformation in the following stages, since in case of the activities of poets, writers, etc. 
this which is encountered (an object, a situation, a person, a mood) serves only as a starting 
point for observation, literary experience and the work of imagination. See: ibidem, p. 37.
12 In his presentation regarding the aesthetic experience – which is a part of the 
aesthetic situation and characterises the experience of the subject participating in it – 
Ingarden states that “The aesthetic experience begins as soon as against the backdrop of 
the perceived or only imagined real object (item or process) a particular quality appears 
[...] not allowing the experiencing subject to remain «cold», but putting him in a particu-
lar emotional state”. Idem, Przeżycie estetyczne, in: idem, Studia z estetyki, t. 3, Warszawa 
1970, pp. 97–98 [trans. M. Bręgiel-Benedyk].
13 On intentionality see: J. Makota, Intencjonalność, in: Słownik pojęć…, op. cit., 
pp. 102–106.
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art. It appears as a consequence of a certain physical process resulting from 
psycho-physical activity of the subject. Ingarden describes it as follows:
If I find some object in my immediate surrounding, if for example someone had 
sent a block of marble to my sculptural studio and now – let us say that I am 
a sculptor – I begin to sculpt a new physical object out of it, a new form which will 
become a physical foundation of a work of art. And something happens to this 
stone, this block of marble, because of my action of sculpting it, etc. Some process 
takes place, some transformations happen, its shapes simply change, so that slow-
ly, after some time we obtain this physical foundation of a work of art14.
The processes indicated by the philosopher occur in the artist’s sur-
roundings and inside him. What is important, and what Ingarden points to, 
is that already in the beginning of an aesthetic situation a complex trans-
formation occurs within the artist himself. Through his artistic work he 
changes, matures, realises and understands more – and in this way be-
comes a creative personality. To complete this diagram with the concept of 
artistic thinking, we could now proceed to elaborate on this transformation 
and the artist’s activity which are merely mentioned by Ingarden. Howev-
er, it is beyond this paper due to its introductory character and limited di-
mension. It will suffice to say that the category of artistic thinking must by 
definition point to intellectual acts occurring within a creative process (like 
for example: turning one’s attention towards an object, quality or person; 
the occurrence of an idea or artistic intention; specifying an idea of a work, 
analysing, making generalisations, planning), which is accompanied by the 
work of imagination – without it no creative activity could possibly occur15. 
Besides, Ingarden claims that at the beginning of the creative process an 
artist enters a game, adopting the particular language of the discipline16. 
Furthermore, he asserts that the language itself is also in a sense an ex-
14 R. Ingarden, Wykład…, op. cit., p. 36.
15 In his interesting work Krytyka myślenia artystycznego, Jerzy Łukaszewicz writes 
about the category of artistic thinking as being among others “a domain of art, and so 
first of all a domain of imagination”, with irrational tendencies inherent to it. He claims 
that the task of artistic thinking is to reveal the hidden order of the world and that it aims 
at changing the reality. See: J. Łukaszewicz, Krytyka myślenia artystycznego, “Estetyka 
i Krytyka”, nr 28 (1/2013), p. 264 [trans. M. Bręgiel-Benedyk].
16 On the importance of game for human life in its cultural dimension see among oth-
ers J. Huizinga, Homo ludens. Zabawa jako źródło kultury, tłum. M. Kurecka, W. Wirpsza, 
Warszawa 2011. H.-G. Gadamer deemed the reality of game an ontological pattern of 
a work of art. See: H.-G. Gadamer, Aktualność piękna. Sztuka jako gra, symbol, święto, tłum. 
K. Krzemieniowa, Warszawa 1993.
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isting object of an aesthetic situation, and should be taken into account in 
every analysis. Speaking about the material foundation of a work of art, it is 
important to note after Ingarden that it can be both permanent and imper-
manent. Domains of art exist which throughout historical transformations 
managed to survive without any material foundation whatsoever, as it hap-
pened e.g. in the case of poetry and literature which were initially preserved 
only through memory17. Various historically changing forms of recording/
preserving art as well as durability of the carriers are another matter: there 
is no such thing as an absolutely durable material foundation – its durability 
is always relative. Furthermore, Ingarden indicates the existence of unre-
corded physical foundation, like e.g. a human voice18.
Analysing yet another passage, this time from the material foundation 
of a work of art to the work of art itself, we note after Ingarden that on the 
subjective level we can speak of a subjective shift of perception, leading 
us through the perceived components to grasping the entire work of art. 
In the objective dimension, however, we cannot speak about transforming 
a certain physical reality, because “the work of art itself is not a physical 
object, even if it is a painting, a sculpture or a work of architecture”19. 
Moreover, as the philosopher claims “somehow a work of art goes beyond 
all that exists in the physical world”20. To sum up, in the objective sense 
there is no difference between the material foundation of a work of art 
and the work itself. On the other hand, the difference is enormous when 
it comes to the subjective level. In the light of Ingarden’s theory, a work of 
art is purely an intentional object, possessing neither an intrinsic being 
nor a capacity for spontaneous development or transformation21. A work 
perceived in this way, however, has got some underspecified places, which 
differentiate it from all the ordinary individual objects. In an aesthetic situ- 
ation, those places get filled by the beholders carrying out an aesthetic 
concretisation of work22. It seems that what Ingarden describes might jus-
tifiably characterise the process of artistic thinking. And the other way 
round: the category of artistic thinking seems to describe the processes 




21 See: M. Gołaszewska, Roman Ingarden (1893–1970), “Studia Estetyczne” 1971, 
t. 8, p. 7. 
22 See: ibidem, p. 7. On the work of art as an intentional being and a schematic con-
struct as well as on the concretisation of the work, see: L. Sosnowski, op. cit., p. 264. 
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occurring during an aesthetic situation much better than the general con-
cept of an aesthetic experience. In his text describing an aesthetic experi-
ence Ingarden writes that as a result of an emotion initialising an aesthet-
ic situation, the subject’s attitude towards the work changes diametrical-
ly, which means that:
[...] the attention of the experiencing subject is then directed not towards the real 
objects and their actuality, but to this which is for now purely qualitative. Not 
a real fact, but only “what” and “what like”; a purely qualitative creation is this 
which is constituted through an aesthetic experience and on which – being the 
object of aesthetic grasping – the experiencing subject is focused23.
The artistic thinking related to this stage of experiencing art could 
thus be characterised by its focus on unreal and imaginary objects as well 
as abstract qualities. The role of an artist or a beholder would then be 
about grasping these abstract creations, imagining them or constructing 
a certain pattern and then filling it with particular content or images. In-
garden explains that also in relation to the passage from a work of art to 
an aesthetic object it is hard to speak about a purely objective process. Ac-
cording to him, an aesthetic object and a work of art are parallel creations, 
whereas the passage requires an analysis regarding the transformations 
of participating subjects24.
Although Ingarden describes an aesthetic situation distinguishing its 
particular elements and providing their detailed description, he at the 
same time repeatedly underlines that these elements should not be con-
sidered seperately. To further specify his stance, he often refers to the 
concepts of game, cooperation, co-action, in this way highlighting the dy-
namic, changeable, fluid character of an aesthetic situation. It should be 
emphasised that it is the general structure of an aesthetic situation that 
23 R. Ingarden, Przeżycie…, op. cit., pp. 98–99.
24 Idem, Wykład…, op. cit., p. 39. In her work Estetyka Romana Ingardena, Anita 
Szczepańska emphasises the significance of the distinction between a work of art and 
an aesthetic object introduced by the philosopher. She claims that it allows to explain 
a range of phenomena “in the face of which the traditional aesthetics remained helpless”. 
By those she means among others the possibility of supporting the hypothesis on the 
identity of a work-pattern as an object of various receiving acts, the hypothesis of a his-
torical variability of the aesthetic objects and the possibility of explaining the discrepan-
cy between the aesthetic evaluations due to the differences between the concretisations. 
See: A. Szczepańska, Estetyka Romana Ingardena, Warszawa 1989, pp. 257–258 [trans. 
M. Bręgiel-Benedyk].
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interests Ingarden and that constitutes the actual field of research for his 
aesthetics. For this reason, he does not analyse any aesthetic situation 
which exceed its basic structure, for example an aesthetic commune with 
nature not resulting in producing works of art25. However, in the light of 
this paper it is interesting how marginal a connection Ingarden makes be-
tween the experience of art and the creative process on the one hand, and 
the work of intellect and the cognitive activity on the other.
The above described passages from one component of an aesthetic sit-
uation to the next, form – as we indirectly expressed already – a descrip-
tion of an aesthetic experience of the subject. The final result of a success-
ful and fully developed aesthetic experience is, according to Ingarden, the 
establishing of an aesthetic object and its direct perception26. This aes-
thetic experience whose particular phases we listed already, according to 
Ingarden comprises of
[...] multiple constitutive experiences: both the acts of expression and the acts of 
creative development or – the very opposite – merely imitative reconstruction and 
comprehension, as well as emotions. All these interweave in many different ways. 
An aesthetic experience constitutes a phase of very active life, in which only at 
some points a purely recipient experience might appear27.
The final phase of an aesthetic experience differs from the preceding ones 
which were characterised by dynamics, the turmoils of quest and discov-
ery. Quite the opposite, the stage related to the already constituted aesthetic 
object puts the subject in a quiet, almost contemplative mood. The subject 
emotionally acknowledges the value of an aesthetic object and thereby ex-
periences something aesthetically valuable28. Therefore we assume that the 
process of artistic thinking might encompass all the phases of an aesthetic 
situation, undergoing changes in accordance with them. Ingarden’s remarks 
regarding the contemplative mood (or more appropriately attitude) towards 
an aesthetic object, encourage us to compare the artistic stance with a philo-
sophical approach, and similarly, the artistic thinking with the philosophical 
one. Such a juxtaposition is nothing new in philosophy, since already Pythag-
oras of Samos describing human life stated that “The purest […] is this kind 
of men who dedicate themselves to contemplation of the most beautiful, and 
25 See: R. Ingarden, Wykłady…, op. cit., p. 40.
26 See: idem, Przeżycie…, op. cit., p. 97.
27 Ibidem, p. 97.
28 See: ibidem, p. 101.
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these are called philosophers […] wisdom is the knowledge about the beau-
tiful and the prime, the divine and the indestructible”29.
Specifying the reasons for undertaking any creative action30, Ingarden 
points to the human ability to go beyond the given. And even more: to the 
human ability to shape/produce something new while at the same time 
emphasising one’s own personality. In Wykład XI, Ingarden states that:
A human himself aims on crystallising something which is not ready, which has 
only just began, because he is somehow convinced that in this way he can pre-
serve, express, reveal and manifest the hidden, subjective course of the processes, 
of which one knows nothing and which are otherwise unshaped. It is the strong 
driving force behind going beyond what is given and creating something new, as 
something which comes from me and is somehow connected to me, with a need to 
preserve this which is connected to my behaviour and existence31.
In the light of the above we might assume that this kind of thinking 
aims at constructing new entireties, values and objects. In that case it is 
for sure a creative kind of thinking – but its results take on mainly artistic 
form (and not for example scientific or utilitarian).
We might also mention here that Ingarden regarded every creative ac-
tivity (be it artistic or scientific) as directed first and foremost towards 
oneself and serving self-fulfillment32. Asking about the need to create per-
manent material foundations of the produced works, Ingarden explains 
that an artist wants and needs to create valuable things with which he 
could repeatedly commune. He is thus trying to establish permanent ma-
terial foundations for the valuable things to exist longer, and to facilitate 
repeated encounters, agitations and experiences of delight. Yet another 
reason for undertaking the artistic activity might be the artist’s need to 
keep in touch with other people, share important values and belong to 
a wider community. In other words, we assume that an artist wants himself 
and his inner world to be accepted by the society. The remarks regarding 
29 Porfiriusz, Jamblich, Anonim, Żywoty Pitagorasa, Wrocław 1993, p. 46. How-
ever, Józef Tischner saw an important difference between philosophical and artistic 
thinking: “philosophical thinking could do without the idea of beauty, and artistic 
thinking could do without the idea of truth”. J. Tischner, Myślenie w żywiole piękna, 
Kraków 2004, p. 8.
30 However it should be underlined that the remark concerns first of all the activ-
ity of an artist creating a given work.
31 R. Ingarden, Wykłady…, op. cit., p. 43.
32 See: ibidem.
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the postulated “need for common emotion and the need for sharing one 
common world with others, and this too a world of some value”33 are par-
ticularly interesting. Ingarden links this need to the effort undertaken to 
break human loneliness through this particular interpersonal community, 
which is the “common world of the same values”34. It is worth mentioning 
that this common space seems to be first of all a thought space (the area 
of artistic thinking), and later also the space experienced in the creations 
of culture as an aesthetic experience. In the final part of his deliberations, 
Ingarden points to the need for immortality, as the driving force of artistic 
activity. He considers the human desire to overcome the fleetingness of all 
things and go beyond the narrow frame of one’s own life. 
In the end of our analysis of artistic thinking – but rather to widen 
the outlined research field than to close it – we would like to recall an 
interesting example of the contemporary views on art and their prospec-
tive applications. In the 2011 conference TED Ideas worth spreading Shea 
Hembrey gave a talk titled How I became 100 artists. He described his 
auteur project of an ideal art biennale uniting 100 artists from all over 
the world and gave a clear criterion of selecting the works. He stated that 
“great art would have «head»: it would have interesting intellectual ide-
as and concepts. It would have «heart» in that it would have passion and 
heart and soul. And it would have «hand» in that it would be greatly craft-
ed”35. Subsequently, he introduced the conclusions which he had arrived 
at in the course of his deliberations – that it is easier to produce all the 
works necessary to organise an exhibition by yourself than to painstak-
ingly search for the right works of the appropriate artists. And so he did; 
the completion of the project took him two years36. At this point we might 
ask how much space is there left for the beholder among such 100 artists? 
Further research hypotheses 
Our research presented in this paper brought us to a hypothesis that the 
category of artistic thinking – properly characterised and worked out e.g. 
33 Ibidem, pp. 43–44.
34 Ibidem, p. 44.
35 S. Hembrey, How I became 100 artists, [online] http://www.ted.com/talks/
shea_hembrey_how_i_became_100_artists?language=en [access: 9.08. 2014].
36 On the results of his work and the international biennale see: [online] http://
www.sheahembrey.com/seek.php [access: 9.08.2014].
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through the incorporation into the structure of Ingarden’s aesthetic situ-
ation – might prove an interesting research tool to be used in the analysis 
of contemporary art. We would be particularly interested in applying the 
described category to the examination of the works of film art, which be-
cause of their complex structure require a particular research approach. 
Film art analyses need to take into account various aspects of film reality 
as well as the layers of the film structure with its concurrent homogen- 
eity. It is also important to consider the dynamics and fluidity of the film 
works37. It seems to us that the pattern of an aesthetic situation and the 
category of artistic thinking could manage also this kind of art.
Translated by Marta Bręgiel-Benedyk
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